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THE SUPREME COURT, ROE v. WADE,
AND ABORTION LAW*
Francis J Beckwitht
It is no exaggeration to say that no U.S. Supreme Court opinion has been
more misunderstood and has had its arguments more misrepresented in the
public square than Roe v. Wade (1973).' There seems to be a widespread
perception that Roe was a moderate opinion that does not support abortion on
demand, i.e., unrestricted abortion for all nine months for virtually any reason.
Even a philosopher of such erudity as Mortimer Adler did not seem to fully
understand the legal implications ofRoe: "Mr. Justice Blackmun's decision in
the case of Roe v. Wade invokes the right of privacy, which is nothing but the
freedom of an adult woman to do as she pleases with her own body in the first
trimester ofpregnancy."2
In order to fully grasp the reasoning of Roe, its paucity as a piece of
constitutional jurisprudence, and the current state of abortion law, this article
looks at three different but interrelated topics: (1) what the Court actually
concluded in Roe; (2) the Court's reasoning in Roe; and (3) how subsequent
Court opinions, including Casey v. Planned Parenthood, have shaped the
jurisprudence of abortion law.3
I. WHAT THE COURT ACTUALLY CONCLUDED IN ROE
The case of Roe v. Wade concerned Jane Roe (a.k.a. Norman McCorvey), a
resident of Texas, who claimed to have become pregnant as a result of a gang
rape (which was found later to be a false charge years after the Court had issued
its opinion).4 According to Texas law at the time (essentially unchanged since
* This article is a revised version of an article that appeared in The Southern Baptist
Journal of Theology. Francis J. Beckwith, Roe v. Wade: Its Logic and Its Legacy, 7.2 S.
BAPTIST J. THEOLOGY 4-29 (Summer 2003).
f Associate Professor of Church-State Studies, and Faculty Associate and Fellow in the
Institute for the Studies of Religion, Baylor University. Ph.D., M.A. (in philosophy), Fordham
University; M.J.S. (Master of Juridical Studies), Washington University School of Law, St.
Louis.
1. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
2. MORTIMER J. ADLER, HAVES WITHOUT HAvE-NOTS: ESSAYS FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY ON
DEMOCRACY AND SOcIALIsM 210 (1991) (emphasis added).
3. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. Abortion-choice advocate and Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe writes: "A decade
and a half after the Court handed down its decision in Roe v. Wade McCorvey explained, with
embarrassment, that she had not been raped after all; she made up the story to hide the fact she
had gotten 'in trouble' in the more usual way." LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
ABSOLUTES 10 (1990).
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1856), a woman could have an abortion only if it was necessary to save her life.
Because Roe's pregnancy was not life-threatening, she sued the state of Texas.
In 1970, the unmarried Roe filed a class action suit in federal district court in
Dallas. The federal court ruled that the Texas law was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad and infringed on a woman's right to reproductive freedom. The
state of Texas appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. After the case was argued
twice before the Court, it issued Roe v. Wade on January 22, 1973, holding that
the Texas law was unconstitutional, and that not only must all states including
Texas permit abortions in cases of rape but in all other cases as well.'
The public does not fully understand the scope of what the Court declared as
a constitutional right on that fateful day in 1973. The current law in the United
States, except for in a few states, does not restrict a woman from procuring an
abortion for practically any reason she deems fit during the entire nine months
of pregnancy.6 That may come as quite a shock to many readers, but that is in
fact the state of the current law.
In Roe, Justice Harry Blackmun, who authored the Court's opinion, divided
pregnancy into trimesters. He ruled that aside from procedural guidelines to
ensure maternal health, a state has no right to restrict abortion in the first six
months of pregnancy. Blackmun wrote:
A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that
excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of
the mother without regard to pregnancy stage and without
recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses,
5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 710-11 (setting forth the facts of the case).
6. For example, in Missouri and Pennsylvania modest restrictions were allowed due to the
Court's rulings in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) and Casey,
505 U.S. 833.
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regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.
Thus, a woman could have an abortion during the first six months of
pregnancy for any reason she deems fit; e.g., unplanned pregnancy, gender-
selection, convenience, or rape. Restrictions in the second trimester should be
merely regulatory in order to protect the pregnant woman's health. In the last
trimester after fetal viability (the time at which the unborn can live outside the
womb) the state has a right, although not an obligation, to restrict abortions to
only those cases in which the mother's life or health is jeopardized, because
after viability, according to Blackmun, the state's interest in prenatal life
becomes compelling. Therefore, Roe does nothing to prevent a state from
allowing unrestricted abortions for the entire nine months of pregnancy.
Nevertheless, the Court explained that it would be a mistake to think of the
right to abortion as absolute. The Court maintained that it took into
consideration the legitimate state interests of both the health of the pregnant
woman and the prenatal life she carries. Thus, reproductive liberty, according
to this reading of Roe, should be seen as a limited freedom established within
the nexus of three parties: the pregnant woman, the unborn, and the state. The
woman's liberty trumps both the value of the unborn and the interests of the
state except when the unborn reaches viability (and an abortion is unnecessary
to preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman) or when the state has a
compelling state interest in regulating abortion before and after viability in
order to make sure that the procedure is performed in accordance with accepted
medical standards. Even though this is a fair reading of Roe's reasoning, it
seems to me that the premise put in place by Justice Blackmun has not resulted
in the sensible balance of interests he claimed his opinion had established. In
practice, his framework has resulted in abortion on demand.
7. Roe, 410 U.S. at 732.
8. "[A]ppellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is
entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time she alone chooses. With this we do not
agree." Id. at 153. The Court writes elsewhere in Roe:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is
not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited
right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right
of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused
to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
2006]
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Because Justice Blackmun claimed that a state only has a compelling interest
in protecting prenatal life after that life is viable (which in 1973 was between
twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks gestation), and because the viability line is
being pushed back in pregnancy (now it is between twenty and twenty-four
weeks) as a result of the increased technological sophistication of incubators
and other devices and techniques, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor commented in
her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (1983) that
Roe is on a "collision course with itself."9 In other words, if viability is pushed
back far enough, the right to abortion will vanish for all practical purposes.
Thus, in principle, a state's interest in a viable fetus can extend back to
conception. Furthermore, Blackmun's choice of viability as the point at which
the state has a compelling interest in protecting prenatal life is based on a
fallacious argument.°'
But there is a loophole to which abortion-choice supporters may appeal in
order to avoid O'Connor's "collision course." Consider one state law written
within the framework of Roe. Nevada restricts abortions after viability by
permitting abortion after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy only if "there is a
substantial risk that the continuance of the pregnancy would endanger the life
of the patient or would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
patient."'" This restriction is one in name only. For the Supreme Court so
broadly defined health in Roe's companion decision, Doe v. Bolton (1973), that
for all intents and purposes, Roe allows for abortion on demand. In Bolton, the
Court ruled that health must be taken in its broadest possible medical context
and must be defined "in light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age--relevant to the well being of the patient"
because "[a]ll these factors relate to health.' 12 Because all pregnancies have
consequences for a woman's emotional and family situation, the Court's health
provision has the practical effect of legalizing abortion up until the time of birth
if a woman can convince a physician that she needs the abortion to preserve her
"emotional health." This is why in 1983 the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee,
after much critical evaluation of the current law in light of the Court's opinions,
confirmed this interpretation when it concluded that "no significant legal
barriers of any kind whatsoever exist today in the United States for a woman to
obtain an abortion for any reason during any stage of her pregnancy.'' 13
9. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,459 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.250(3) (2006).
12. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
13. S. Rep. No. 98-149, at 6 (1983). In another report, the Judiciary Committee concludes:
[Vol. 1:1
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Former-Chief Justice Warren Burger originally sided with the majority in
Roe because he was under the impression that abortion after viability would
only occur if the mother's physical life and health were in imminent peril.
However, he later concluded that Roe did, in fact, support abortion on demand.
In his dissenting opinion to Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists he stated:
We have apparently already passed the point at which abortion is
available merely on demand.... The point at which these [State]
interests become "compelling" under Roe is at viability of the fetus.
Today, however, the Court abandons that standard and renders the
solemnly stated concerns of the 1973 Roe opinion for the interests
of the States mere shallow rhetoric.
1 4
Others came to the same conclusion much earlier than Chief Justice Burger.
1 5
The apparently restrictive standard for the third trimester has in fact proved no
different from the standard of abortion on demand expressly allowed during the
first six months of the unborn child's life. The exception for maternal health has
been so broad in practice as to swallow the rule. The Supreme Court has defined
'health' in this context to include 'all factors-physical, emotional, familial, and
the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient.' Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 192 (1973). Since there is nothing to stop an abortionist from certifying
that a third-trimester abortion is beneficial to the health of the mother-in this
broad sense-the Supreme Court's decision has in fact made abortion available on
demand throughout the pre-natal life of the child, from conception to birth.
Report on the Human Life Bill, S. 158; Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 5 (1981).
14. Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 783-84
(1986) (citations omitted).
15. See STEPHEN M. KRASON, ABORTION: POLITIcs, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION
103-04 (1984); John T. Noonan, Jr., Raw Judicial Power, in THE ZERO PEOPLE 18 (Jeff Lane
Hensley ed., 1983); Victor G. Rosenblum & Thomas J. Marzen, StrategiesforReversing Roe v.
Wade through the Courts, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE
THROUGH THE COURTS 195, 199-200 (Dennis Horan et al. eds., 1987); LYNN D. WARDLE &
MARY ANNE Q. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 12 (1982); Roger Wertheimer,
Understanding Blackmun's Argument: The Reasoning of Roe v. Wade, in ABORTION: MORAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 120-21 (1984); Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The
Needfor a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1250 (1975); John Hart Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 921 (1973); Jacqueline Nolan Haley,
Haunting Shadows from the Rubble of Roe's Right to Privacy, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 152-53
(1974); Stanely M. Harrison, The Supreme Court andAbortional Reform: Means to an End, 19
2006]
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Moreover, it is not clear that when the Court refers to viability as the time
when the state has a compelling interest in prenatal life that it is referring only
to the physical survival of the unborn apart from her mother. Rather, it may be
suggesting a largely philosophical notion of "meaningful life"-a determination
that is exclusively in the hands of the pregnant woman. 16 Although in Roe
"meaningful life" seemed to mean a life that is physically independent of its
mother,' 7 the Court made the point in a later opinion: "[T]here must be a
potentiality of 'meaningful life' ... not merely momentary survival.'
II. THE COURT'S REASONING IN ROE: HOW IT FOUND
A RIGHT TO ABORTION
By the time Roe reached the Supreme Court, the Court had already
established a right to contraceptive use both by married couples and single
people based on the right of privacy. 19 Therefore, it would seem that abortion,
as a method of birth control, would be protected under the same interpretation
N.Y. L. F. 690 (1974); William R. Hopkin, Jr., Roe v. Wade and the Traditional Legal
Standards Concerning Pregnancy, 47 TEMPLE L. Q. 729-30 (1974); John Warwick
Montgomery, The Rights of Unborn Children, 5 SIMoN GREENLEAF L. REv. 40 (1985-86);
Thomas O'Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides a Non-Case, SuP. CT. REv. 344 (1974);
Charles E. Rice, Overruling Roe v. Wade: An Analysis of the Proposed Constitutional
Amendments, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 309 (1973).
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
17. See discussion infra Part III (analysis of Casey).
18. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163). However,
given the Court's analysis in Casey and that opinion's understanding of Roe, it may reject
Colautti's definition of "meaningful life," though one may never really know for sure.
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing a right to contrceptive use
by married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (establishing a right to the use of
contraceptives by unmarried couples). In the words of Justice Brennan, author of the majority
opinion in Eisenstadt:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision to bear and beget a child.
Id. at 453.
[Vol. 1: 1
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of the right of privacy.20 However, in order to make this move, there were at
least two legal impediments that Justice Blackmun had to eliminate.
First, starting in the nineteenth century, anti-abortion laws had been on the
books in virtually every U.S. state and territory for the primary reason of
protecting the unborn from unjust killing. If, as Justice Douglas asserts in
Griswold, the "right of privacy [is] older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system," then the Court must account for
the proliferation of anti-abortion laws, whose constitutionality were not
seriously challenged until the late 1960s, in a legal regime whose legislators
and citizens passed these laws with apparently no inclination to believe that
they were inconsistent with a right of privacy "older than the Bill of Rights."2
Second, constitutionally, the unborn is a person protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. After all, unlike contraception, in which the adult
participants in the sexual act consent to the use of the contraceptive device, and
where a third party, the unborn, is not yet in existence, a successful abortion
entails the killing of a third party, a living organism, the unborn, who has
already come into being.22 So, in order to justify abortion the Court had to
20. This is not to say that one may not raise objections to the "right of privacy." For its
proponents admit that this right has no connection to the actual language of the Constitution's
text. According to Justice William 0. Douglas, who penned the plurality opinion in Griswold,
this right of privacy can be gleaned, not from a literal reading of the words found in the Bill of
Rights, but from "penumbras" that stand behind these words, and these penumbras are "formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Griswold, 381
U.S. at 484. Douglas goes on to say:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for a noble purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486.
21. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
22. As Justice Blackmun writes in Roe:
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and,
later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the
uterus.... The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or
bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education
.... As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to
decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or
that of potential human life, become significantly involved. The woman's privacy
20061
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show that the unborn is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. If the
Court had good reasons to reject these two jurisprudential challenges, then it
could establish a right to abortion as a species of the right of privacy.
Justice Blackmun agreed with opponents of abortion rights that anti-abortion
laws have been on the books in the U.S. for quite some time. However,
according to Blackmun, the purpose of these laws, almost all of which were
passed in the nineteenth century, was not to protect prenatal life, but rather, to
protect the pregnant woman from a dangerous medical procedure. 3  At
common law, abortion was regulated in relation to the "quickening" of the
unborn, the "first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing
usually from the sixteenth to the eighteenth week of pregnancy.' 24 Blackmun
argues that under the common law's framework, prior to the enactment of
statutory abortion regulations, abortion was permissible prior to quickening and
was at most a misdemeanor after quickening.25 Therefore, Justice Blackmun
claims that because abortion is now a relatively safe procedure, there is no
longer a reason for its prohibition.26 Consequently, Justice Blackmun asserts
that given the right of privacy, and given the abortion liberty at common law,
the Constitution must protect a right to abortion.
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured
accordingly.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (citations omitted).
23. Justice Blackmun writes: "[I]t has been argued that a State's real concern in enacting a
criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting
to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy." Id. at 149.
24. Id. at 132 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 132-36. Justice Blackmun writes:
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our
Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was
viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect.
Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate
a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early
stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to
make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century.
Id. at 140-41.
26. Id. at 149 ("Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure
is legal, appear to be as low or as lower than the rates of normal childbirth. Consequently, any
interest of the State in protecting the woman from an inherently dangerous procedure, except
when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely disappeared.").
[Vol. 1: 1
HeinOnline -- 1 Liberty U. L. Rev. 44 2006
ROE V. WADE AND ABORTION LAW
The history of abortion figures prominently in the Court's opinion in Roe27
Justice Blackmun, in twenty-three pages, takes the reader on an historical
excursion through ancient attitudes (including those held by the Greeks and
Romans), the Hippocratic Oath, the common law, the English statutory law, the
American law, and the positions of the American Medical Association (AMA),
the American Public Health Association (APHA), and the American Bar
Association (ABA). The purpose for this history is clear: if abortion's
prohibition is only recent, and primarily for the purpose of protecting the
pregnant woman from dangerous surgery, then the Court would not be creating
a new right out of whole cloth by affirming a right to abortion. However, only
the history of the common law is relevant to assessing the Constitutionality of
this right, because, as Blackmun himself admits, "it was not until after the War
Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common
law. 28 However, Justice Blackmun's historical chronology is "simply wrong,"
because twenty-six of thirty-six states had already banned abortion by the time
the Civil War had ended.29  Nevertheless, when statutes did not address a
criminal wrong, common law was the authoritative resource from which juries,
judges, and justices, found the principles from which, and by which, they
issued judgments.
However, since 1973 the overwhelming consensus of scholarship has shown
that the Court's history, especially its interpretation of the common law, is
almost entirely mistaken. Justice Blackmun's history (excluding his discussion
of contemporary professional groups: AMA, APHA, and ABA) is so flawed
that it has inspired the production of scores of scholarly works, which are nearly
unanimous in concluding that Justice Blackmun's "history" is untrustworthy
and essentially worthless.30 However, for its modest purposes, this Article will
27. Id. at 129-51.
28. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
29. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History ofAbortion: Technology, Morality andLaw, 40 U.
PIT. L. REV. 359, 389 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Martin Arbagi, Roe and the Hypocratic Oath, in ABORTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 159 (Dennis Horan et al. eds.,
1987); John R. Connery, The Ancients and the Medievels on Abortion: The Consensus the
Court Ignored, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE
COURTS 123 (Dennis Horan et al. eds., 1987); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Abortion and the Law:
Blackman's Distortion of the Historical Record, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 137 (Dennis Horan et al. eds., 1987); Dennis J.
Horan & Thomas J. Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Justification in History, Law, or Logic, in THE
ABORTION CONTROVERSY 25 YEARS AFTER ROE V. WADE: A READER (Louis P. Pojman &
Francis J. Beckwith eds., 2d ed. 1998); JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW:
SOME ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1803 TO 1982 3-25
(1988); KRASON, supra note 15, at 134-57; STEPHEN KRASON & W. HOLLBERG, THE LAW AND
2006]
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assess the two aspects of the Court's history that are the most central, as
mentioned above: (1) the purpose of nineteenth century anti-abortion statutes,
and (2) the unborn's status as a Fourteenth Amendment person.
A. Were Anti-Abortion Laws Meant to Protect the Unborn?
Blackmun was wrong about the primary purpose of the anti-abortion laws.
Although protecting the pregnant woman was an important purpose of these
statutes, there is no doubt that their primary purpose was to protect the unborn
from harm.31 Analysis of the nineteenth century statutes, their legislative
histories, and the political climate in which they were passed, confirms this
32point, as James S. Witherspoon summarizes:
[T]he primary purpose of the nineteenth-century antiabortion
statutes was to protect the lives of unborn children is clearly shown
by the terms of the statutes themselves. This primary purpose, or
legislative recognition of the personhood of the unborn child, or
both, are manifested, in the following elements of these statutes,
taken individually and collectively: (1) the provision of an increased
range of punishment for abortion if it were proven that the attempt
caused the death of the child; (2) the provision of the same range of
punishment for attempted abortions killing the unborn child as for
attempted abortions killing the mother; (3) the designation of
attempted abortion and other acts killing the unborn child as
"manslaughter"; (4) the prohibition of all abortions except those
necessary to save the life of the mother; (5) the reference to the fetus
as a "child"; (6) the use of the term "person" in reference to the
unborn child; (7) the categorization of abortion with homicide and
related offenses and offenses against born children; (8) the severity
of punishments assessed for abortions; (9) the provision that
attempted abortion killing the mother is only manslaughter or a
HIsTORY OF ABORTION: THE SUPREME COURT REFUTED (1984); MARVIN OLASKY, ABORTION
RrrEs: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN AMERICA (1992); Harold O.J. Brown, What the
Supreme Court Didn't Know: Ancient and Early Christian Views on Abortion, I HUMAN LIFE
REv. 5 (1975); Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORDHAM L. REv. 807 (1973); Dellapenna, supra note 29; John Gorby, The "Right" to an
Abortion, the Scope of Fourteenth Amendment "Personhood" and the Supreme Court's Birth
Requirement, 1979 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1; Robert Sauer, Attitudes to Abortion in America, 1800-1973,
28 POPULATION STUD. 53 (1974); James S. Witherspoon, Reexaming Roe: Nineteenth-Century
Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 29 (1985).
31. See generally Witherspoon, supra note 30.
32. Id.
[Vol. 1:1
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felony rather than murder as at common law; (10) the requirement
that the woman on whom the abortion is attempted be pregnant; (11)
the requirement that abortion be attempted with intent to produce
abortion or to "destroy the child"; and (12) the incrimination of the
woman's participation in her own abortion. Legislative recognition
of the personhood of the unborn child is also shown by the
legislative history of these statutes.
In short, the Supreme Court's analysis in Roe v. Wade of the
development, purposes, and the understandings underlying the
nineteenth-century antiabortion statutes, was fundamentally
erroneous. That analysis can provide no support whatsoever for the
Court's conclusions that the unborn children are not "persons"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and that states do
not otherwise have a "compelling interest" in protecting their lives
by prohibiting abortion.33
The primary reason for Justice Blackmun's historical mistake, according to
many scholars, is his almost total reliance on two articles by Professor Cyril
Means, who was an attorney for the National Association for the Repeal of
Abortion Laws (NARAL).34 Professor Means's work has been occasionally
cited favorably; however, since 1973, his work has come under devastating
criticism. 35 For that reason his work is no longer considered an authoritative
rendering of abortion law.
It is interesting to note that as biological knowledge of both human
development and the unborn's nature began to increase, the laws prohibiting
abortion became more restrictive. Justice Blackmun was correct when he
pointed out that at common law pre-quickening abortion "was not an indictable
offense., 36 Indeed, it was thought that prior to quickening the unborn was not
animated or infused with a soul. 37 But that was an erroneous belief based on
33. Id. at 70.
34. Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth
Amendment Right About to Rise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-
Amendment Common Law Liberty, 17 N.Y. L.F. 335 (1971); Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of
New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Fetus: 1664-1968, 14 N.Y. L. F. 441
(1968).
35. See TRIBE, supra note 4, at 27-41, 119-20; Susan Estrich, Abortion Politics: Writing
for an Audience of One, U. PENN. L. REv. 138, 152-54 (1989). See also Byrn, supra note 30;
KRAsON, supra note 15, at 134-57; Dellapenna, supra note 30.
36. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 132(1973).
37. Id. at 133.
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primitive embryology and outdated biology. People indeed believed that prior
to quickening there was no life and thus no soul, but they were mistaken, just as
they were mistaken about Ptolemaic astronomy, the divine right of kings, and
white supremacy, none of which seem to be an acceptable belief today even
though each is of more ancient origin than their widely-accepted counterparts of
heliocentricity, constitutional democracy, and human equality.38 As biology
acquired more facts about human development, quickening began to be
dismissed as an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion by which to distinguish
between protected and unprotected human life. "When better knowledge was
acquired in the nineteenth century, laws began to be enacted prohibiting
abortion at every stage of pregnancy.
3 9
Only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century did
biological research advance to the extent of understanding the actual
mechanism of development. The nineteenth century saw a gradual
but profoundly influential revolution in the scientific understanding
of the beginning of individual mammalian life. Although sperm had
been discovered in 1677, the mammalian egg was not identified
until 1827. The cell was first recognized as the structural unit of
organisms in 1839, and the egg and sperm were recognized as cells
in the next two decades. These developments were brought to the
attention of the American state legislatures and public by those
professionals most familiar with their unfolding import-physicians.
It was the new research finding which persuaded doctors that the old
"quickening" distinction embodied in the common and some
statutory law was unscientific and indefensible.40
Legal scholar and theologian John Warwick Montgomery points out that when
the common law and American statutory law employed the quickening criterion
"they were just identifying the first evidence of life they could conclusively
detect .... They were saying that as soon as you had life, there must be
protection. Now we know that life starts at the moment of conception with
nothing superadded."'1
38. Obviously, false beliefs may be widely held. The point here is that an ancient belief
may be abandoned because it is false. That is, a belief's age has no bearing on its truthfulness.
39. KRASON, supra note 15, at 148.
40. The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 474 (1981) (statement of Victor
Rosenblum, Professor of Law, Northwestern University).
41. JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS 37 (1981).
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Witherspoon writes:
Clearly, the quickening doctrine was not based on an absurd belief that a
living fetus is worthy of protection by virtue of its capacity for
movement or its mother's perception of such movement. The occurrence
of quickening was deemed significant only because it showed that the
fetus was alive, and because it was alive and human, it was protected by
the criminal law. This solution was deemed acceptable as long as the
belief persisted that the fetus was not alive until it began to move, a
belief that would be refuted in the early nineteenth century.42
Therefore, one could say that the quickening criterion, prior to the
discoveries of modern biology, was employed as an evidentiary criterion so that
the law could know that a human life existed, for one could not be prosecuted
for performing an abortion if the being violently removed from the womb was
not considered alive.
B. Is the Unborn a Person under the Fourteenth Amendment?
The Fourteenth Amendment became part of the U.S. Constitution in 1868. It
was passed for the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens, including recently freed
slaves, from having their rights violated by local and state governments. The
portion of the amendment germane to this Article reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the state wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.43
In making his arguments, Justice Blackmun conscripts the Fourteenth
Amendment for two reasons. First, he argues that the right of privacy is a
fundamental liberty protected by the Amendment, and that the right to abortion
is a species of the general right of privacy.44 Second, he argues that the unborn
42. Witherspoon, supra note 30, at 32.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 153 (1973) ("The right ofprivacy, whether it be founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon State action, as
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
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is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the first depends on
the second, and Blackmun admits as much, this Article will focus exclusively
on the latter use of the Fourteenth Amendment in Blackmun's analysis.
45
Justice Blackmun offers a combination of three reasons for his conclusion that
the unborn are not Fourteenth Amendment persons. First, he maintains that
"the Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words," and goes on to
list all the places in the Constitution in which the word "person" is mentioned.46
terminate her pregnancy.").
45. Id. at 157-58 ("The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a 'person' within
the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at
length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion ofpersonhood
is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument.
On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument that no case could be cited that holds
that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
46. Id. As examples, Justice Blackmun lists the Fourteenth Amendment (sections 1,2, and
3); the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators; the Apportionment Clause; the
Migration and Importation provision; the Emolument Clause; the Electors provision; the
provision outlining qualifications for the office of President; the Extradition provisions; the
superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments.
Id. According to Blackmun, "in nearly all these instances, the use of the word [person] is such
that it has application postnatally" with no "possible prenatal application." Id. In a note
following this statement by Justice Blackmun, the Court writes:
When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection as
a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither in Texas nor in any other State are all
abortions prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an exception always exists. The
exception contained in Art. 1196, for an abortion procured or attempted by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, is typical. But if
the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of law,
and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception
appear to be out of line with the Amendment's command?
Id. at 158 n.54. Given the sui generis nature of pregnancy, the life of the mother exception is
perfectly consistent with, and incorporates the principle that grounds, the common law notion of
justified homicide for self-defense. Because a continued pregnancy that imperils a woman's life
will likely result in the death of both mother and child, the law, by permitting this exception,
allowed physicians and patients the freedom to make a medical judgment that would result in at
least one life being saved. Thus, if Justice Blackmun had chosen to exercise his imagination, the
apparent inconsistency he thought he had found in the Texas law would have disappeared. The
Court also presents another argument:
There are other inconsistencies between Fourteenth Amendment status and the
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Second, he claims that Texas could not cite any cases in which a court held
that an unborn human being is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment.47
Third, he stated that throughout most of the nineteenth century, abortion was
practiced with fewer legal restrictions than in 1972. Based on these three
reasons, the Court was persuaded that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. 'As Each reason is
seriously flawed.
In citing the constitutional provisions that apply to postnatal human beings as
evidence that the Constitution's drafters did not intend to recognize the
personhood of the unborn, Justice Blackmun begs the question. None of the
provisions define the meaning of "person," and therefore, none of them exclude
the unborn. Rather, with the exceptions of the Fugitive Slave Clause and the
Migration and Importation provision, both of which were eliminated by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the constitutional provisions Justice
typical abortion statute. It has already been pointed out.., that in Texas the
woman is not a principal or an accomplice with respect to an abortion upon her. If
the fetus is a person, why is the woman not a principal or an accomplice? Further,
the penalty for criminal abortion specificed by Art. 1195 is significantly less than
the maximum penalty for murder perscribed by Art. 1257 of the Texas Penal Code.
If the fetus is a person, may the penalties be different?
Id at 158 n.54. Although I address this and a similar argument in greater detail in Chapter Five
of my book DEFENDING LIFE: A MORAL AND LEGAL AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE (2007), I will
make a few brief comments here in this note. First, if Blackmun is correct that Texas' laws are
inconsistent with its claim that the unborn is a Fourteenth Amendment person, it does not prove
that the unborn are not human persons or that abortion is not a great moral evil. It simply
proves that Texas was unwilling to "bite the bullet" and consistently apply its position. The
unborn may still be a Fourteenth Amendment person, even if the laws of Texas do not
adequately reflect that. Texas' inconsistency, if there really is one, proves nothing, for if the
unborn is a Fourteenth Amendment person, then Texas' laws violate the unborn's equal
protection; but if the unborn is not a Fourteenth Amendment person, then Texas' laws violate
the pregnant woman's fundamental liberty. How a statute treats the unborn's assailants has no
bearing on what the unborn in fact is. Second, the Roe Court did not take into consideration the
possible reasons why Texas' statutes and those of other states granted women immunity or light
sentences and specified penalties for abortionists not as severe in comparison to penalties for
non-abortion homicides. These reasons were thought by legislators to justify penalties they
believed had the best chance of limiting the most abortion-homicides as possible. Thus, Texas'
penalties as well as those of other states were consistent with affirming the unborn as a
Fourteenth Amendment person. See FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, DEFNEDING LIFE: A MORAL AND
LEGAL CASE AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE (2007).
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
48. Id. at 158.
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Blackmun cites concern matters that apply to already existing persons.49 For
example, the Fourteenth Amendment defines citizens as "all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," but it
does not define persons.50 The reference to the qualifications of Congressmen
tells us that a senator must be at least thirty years old and a representative at
least twenty-five, but clearly the court cannot be saying that because the fetus
cannot hold these offices that he or she is not a person (for this would mean that
twenty-year olds are not persons either).51 To cite one more example, the
Apportionment Clause instructs the government whom to count in the national
census.12 Although the clause excludes the unborn from the census, it also
excludes non-taxed Indians and declares black slaves as three-fifths of a person,
even though Indians and black slaves are in fact persons. There were, of
course, important practical reasons why a government may exclude the unborn
from the census. It is extremely difficult and highly inefficient to count unborn
persons because we cannot see them and some of them die before birth without
the mother ever being aware that she was pregnant. Also, at the time of the
American Founding, "because of the high mortality rate ...it was very
uncertain if a child would even be born alive." Moreover, "it was not yet
known that the child from conception is a separate, distinct human organism.
53
Although it is true that Texas did not cite any cases holding that the unborn
is a Fourteenth Amendment person, there was at least one federal court case
that did issue such a holding. Ironically that case, Steinberg v. Brown, was
cited by the Court in Roe.54 However, for some reason Justice Blackmun failed
to mention that the federal court in Steinberg provided the following analysis:
[C]ontraception, which is dealt with in Griswold, is concerned with
preventing the creation of a new and independent life. The right
and power of a man or a woman to determine whether or not to
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII;
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50. The Amendment seems to be saying that birth is a state that persons undergo rather than
an event that makes them persons, and that therefore, the unborn are persons who shift from
prenatal to postnatal when they undergo birth. My then-12-year old nephew, Dean James
Beckwith, made this same point when I read the relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment
to him and his father, my brother, Dr. James A. Beckwith.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
52. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
53. KRASON, supra note 15, at 168.
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741
(N.D. Ohio 1970)).
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participate in this process of creation is clearly a private and
personal one with which the law cannot and should not interfere.
It seems clear, however, that the legal conclusion in Griswold as
to the rights of individuals to determine without governmental
interference whether or not to enter into the process of procreation
cannot be extended to cover those situations wherein, voluntarily or
involuntarily, the preliminaries have ended, and a new life has
begun. Once human life has commenced, the constitutional
protections found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose
upon the state the duty of safeguarding it."
What the Court suggests in Steinberg should be uncontroversial: a legal
principle has universal application. For example, if a statute that forbids
burglary became law at a time when no computers existed, it would not follow
that the prohibition against burglary does not apply to computers, or that one is
free to burgle computers from the homes of one's neighbors since the "original
intent" of the statute's framers did not include computers. What matters is
whether the entity stolen is property, that it is a thing that can be owned, not
whether it is a particular thing (in this case, a computer) that the authors of the
anti-burglary statute knew or did not know to be property at the time of its
passage.
To employ another analogy, the religion clauses of the First Amendment
apply to religious believers whose faiths came to be after the Constitution was
ratified. For example a Baha'i is protected by the First Amendment even
though The Baha'i Faith did not exist in 1789.6 Therefore, if the unborn is a
person, the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to protect him or her even if the
authors of the Fourteenth Amendment did not have the unborn in mind.57 As
we shall see below, Texas presented this premise as part of its case for the
unborn's humanity. The Court, ironically, accepted this premise, but refused to
fairly assess the argument offered by Texas, settling instead for taking "no
position" on the status of the unborn.
Blackmun's third reason is misleading. As we saw in our analysis of the
nineteenth century anti-abortion laws, state governments grasped the
55. Steinberg, 321 F. Supp. at 746-47.
56. See Francis J. Beckwith, Baha'ism, in DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY RELIGION IN TM
WESTERN WORLD 168-71 (Christopher Partridge et al. eds., 2002).
57. This is why some conservative legal scholars, such as Robert Bork, are mistaken when
they say that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot in principle be applied to the unborn. See
Nathan Schlueter & Robert H. Bork, Constitutional Persons: An Exchange on Abortion, First
Things 129 (Jan. 2003). Thank you to Jim Stoner for bringing this essay to my attention.
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inadequacy of the common law's quickening criterion when they became aware
of the nature of prenatal human life. Consequently, by the end of the 19th-
century abortion was prohibited throughout pregnancy. As we saw, the primary
purpose of these statutes was to protect prenatal human life. Moreover, some
scholars have offered compelling reasons to think that at the times of the
passage of the Constitution in 1789 and the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,
common understanding held that the unborn is a person (at least after
quickening), and that a state or the federal government may legislate in such a
way so as to place the unborn (even before quickening) under the protections of
the law without violating the Constitution.58
The state of Texas suggested, as the Court held in Steinberg, that the unborn
is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because it is in fact a person. That
is, even if Justice Blackmun was correct that the unborn has never been
considered a full person under the law, Texas argued that the evidence for the
unborn's humanity requires that the Court in the present treat the unborn as a
Fourteenth Amendment person. For example, if the Earth were visited by
members of an alien race, such as the Vulcans of Star Trek lore, it would seem
correct to say that these aliens would have Fourteenth Amendment rights, even
though they are not homo sapiens. They would have these rights because they
would be beings whose natures have properties (e.g., the capacity for moral
choice) identically possessed by the sorts of beings the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to protect.
59
Confronting, though not disputing, Texas's evidence for the unborn's
humanity, Justice Blackmun replied: "We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines
of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a
58. For historical analysis and citations of the relevant literature, see KASON, supra note
15, at 164-73.
59. One of our Ph.D. students at Baylor, T. Hunter Baker (who also happens to be my
graduate assistant) made the observation to me that this is tricky because children and non-
citizens do not have the full panoply of constitutional rights as adult citizens. There is no doubt
that Hunter is correct: there are rights and privileges that are specific to one's age or citizenship.
The question, then, is whether the right to life should depend on those contingencies. After all,
those rights that are contingent on maturity or nationality presuppose that the being in question
is the sort of being who can in principle have the full panoply of legal rights. For example, a
seventeen year-old citizen will acquire the right to vote when she turns eighteen, but a baboon,
at whatever age, will never have the right to vote. A certain level of maturity on the part of a
citizen is required in order for the state to grant her the right to vote. However, all that is
necessary for a right to life is to be alive. This is why we cannot murder illegal aliens or five-
year olds, even though neither group can vote or be elected to Congress.
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position to speculate., 60 Hence, the state should not take one theory of life and
force those who do not agree with that theory to subscribe to it, which is the
reason why Blackmun wrote in Roe: "In view of all this, we do not agree that,
by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant
woman that are at stake., 61 Thus for the pro-life advocate to propose that non-
pro-life women should be forbidden from having abortions, on the basis that
individual humanity begins at conception or at least sometime before birth, is
clearly a violation of the right of privacy of non-pro-life women.
But the problem with this reasoning is that it simply cannot deliver on it
what it promises. For to claim, as Justices Blackmun does, that the Court should
not propose one theory of life over another, and that the decision to abort
should be left exclusively to the discretion of each pregnant woman, is to
propose a theory of life, which hardly has a clear consensus. For the Court's
theory segregates the unborn from full-fledged membership in the human
community, for it in practice excludes the unborn from constitutional
protection. Although the Court denied taking sides on the issue of when life
begins, part of the theoretical grounding of its legal opinion is that the unborn
in this society is not a human person worthy of protection. Thus, the Court
actually did take a side on the question of when life begins. It concluded that
the unborn is not a human person, because the abortion procedure permitted in
Roe is something that the Court itself admits could not be a fundamental right if
it were conclusively proven that the unborn is a human person. The Court
stated that "[i]f the suggestion of personhood [of the unborn] is established, the
appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life is then
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth Amendment]."62
If we are to accept the Supreme Court's holding in Roe, and agree with
Justice Blackmun that the right to abortion is contingent upon the status of the
unborn, then the allegedly disputed fact about life's beginning means that the
right to abortion is disputed as well. The support for a conclusion, such as the
one in Roe that "abortion is a fundamental right," is only as good as the veracity
of its most important premise-in this case, "the unborn is not fully human."
Thus, the Court's admission that abortion-choice is based on a widely-disputed
fact, far from establishing a right to abortion, entails that it not only does not
know when life begins but does not know when, if ever, the right to abortion
begins. Consequently, the Court's admitted ignorance of when life begins
undermines the right to abortion.
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id. at 157-58.
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Justice Blackmun's argument is flawed in another peculiar way, a way that
actually provides a compelling reason to prohibit abortion. According to the
logic of Blackmun's argument, an abortion may result in the death of a human
entity who has a full right to life. When claiming that experts disagree on when
life begins, Justice Blackmun seems to imply that the different theories on the
beginning of personhood all have able defenders, persuasive arguments, and
passionate advocates. However, none really wins the day. To put it another
way, the issue of the unborn's full humanity is up for grabs. All positions are in
some sense equal, none is better than any other. But if this is the case, then it is
safe to say that the odds of the unborn being fully human are 50/50 (if we
wanted to put a number on a reasonable, though disputed, position held by a
sizeable number of well-informed and educated adults in the world). Given
these odds, it would seem that society has a moral obligation to err on the side
of life, and therefore to legally prohibit virtually all abortions. After all, if one
kills another being without knowing whether that being is a human being with a
full right to life, and if one has reasonable, though disputed, grounds (as
Blackmun admits) to believe that the being in question is fully human, such an
action would constitute a willful and reckless disregard for others, even if one
later discovered that the being was not fully human.
Consider this illustration. Imagine the police are able to identify someone as
a murderer with only one piece of evidence: his DNA matches the DNA of the
genetic material found on the victim. The police subsequently arrest him, and
he is convicted and sentenced to death. Suppose, however, that it is discovered
several months later that the murderer has an identical twin brother who was
also at the scene of the crime and obviously has the same DNA as his brother
on death row. This means that there is a 50/50 chance that the man on death
row is the murderer. Would the state be justified in executing this man? Surely
not, for there is a 50/50 chance of executing an innocent person. Consequently,
if it is wrong to kill the man on death row, it is then wrong to kill the unborn
when the arguments for its full humanity are just as reasonable as the arguments
against it.
1m. AFTER ROE
From 1973 to 1989 the Supreme Court struck down every state attempt to63
restrict an adult woman's access to abortion. The U.S. Congress tried, and
63. See Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(striking a Pennsylvania statute that required informed consent of abortion's possible risks to a
woman, that required that the pregnant woman be informed of agencies that would help her if
she brought child to term, that the abortion provider report certain statistics about their patients
[Vol. 1: 1
HeinOnline -- 1 Liberty U. L. Rev. 56 2006
ROE v. WADE AND ABORTION LA W
failed, to pass a Human Life Bill in order to protect the unborn by means of
ordinary legislation, and later it failed to pass a Human Life Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Although the Court upheld Congress's ban on federal
funding of abortions that are not required to save the life of the mother, it never
wavered on Roe.64 Given these political and legal realities, prolife advocates
put their hopes in the Supreme Court appointees of two prolife presidents,
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, to help overturn Roe. Between Reagan
and Bush, they would appoint five justices to the Court (Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, David Souter) who,
prolife advocates mistakenly thought, all shared the judicial philosophies of the
presidents who appointed them. Ironically, it would be three of those justices,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, who would join the Court's opinion in Casey
v. Planned Parenthood and uphold Roe. And two of them, O'Connor and
Souter, would go even further, joining three of their brethren in Stenberg v.
Carhart in finding partial-birth abortion to be constitutional.65
Nevertheless, three years before Casey, the Court seemed to be moving
toward a rejection of Roe. Many prolife advocates interpreted Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services to be a sign that the Court was preparing to
dismantle the regime of Roe.66 In Webster, the Court reversed a lower-court
decision and upheld several provisions of a Missouri statute designed to
regulate abortion.67  The statute probably would not have survived
constitutional muster in the years soon after Roe, and the Court's decision
marked a willingness to restrict some aspects of abortion. First, the Court
upheld the statute's preamble, which states that "[t]he life of each human being
begins at conception," and that "[u]nborn children have protectable interest in
life, health, and well-being., 68  The Court also upheld a provision which
to the state, and that a second physician be present at the abortion when fetal viability is
possible); City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding
various provisions unconstitutional, including an informed consent requirement, twenty-four-
hour waiting period, parental consent requirement, compulsory hospitalization for second
trimester abortions, and humane and sanitary disposal of fetal remains); Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979) (state may not define viability or enjoin physicians to prove the fetus is
viable in order to require that they have a duty to preserve the life of the fetus if a pregnancy
termination is performed; "viability" is whatever the physician judges it is in a particular
pregnancy); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding
unconstitutional parental and spousal consent requirements as well as a state ban on saline [or
salt poisoning] abortions, a procedure that literally bums the skin of the unborn).
64. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
65. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
66. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 504 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986)).
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stipulated that the unborn should be treated as full persons who possess "all
rights, privileges, immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents
of the state," contingent upon the U.S. Constitution and prior Supreme Court
opinions. 69 Because these precedents would include Roe, the statute poses no
threat to the abortion liberty.
Second, the Webster Court upheld the portion of the Missouri statute that
forbade the use of government facilities, funds, and employees in performing
and counseling for abortions except if the procedure is necessary to save the life
of the mother.
70
Third, the Court upheld another of the statute's provisions, which mandates
that:
[b]efore a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason
to believe is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks
gestational age, the physician shall first determine if the unborn child
is viable by using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and
proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful, and
prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the same or
similar conditions.
71
Thus, the statute requires that the physician employ procedures to properly
assess the unborn's viability and enter the findings of these procedures in the
mother's medical record.72 In passing this statute, Missouri's legislature took
seriously Roe's viability marker-that at the time of viability the state has a
compelling interest in protecting unborn life. This is why the Court, in
Webster, correctly concluded that "[t]he Missouri testing requirement here is
reasonably designed to ensure that abortions are not performed where the fetus
is viable-an end which all concede is legitimate-and that is sufficient to
sustain its constitutionality.,
73
However, Webster modified Roe in at least two significant ways. First, it
rejected Roe's trimester breakdown. Second, it rejected Roe's claim that the
state's interest in prenatal life becomes compelling only at viability. In
Webster, the Court stated:
69. Id. at 504 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986)) (footnote ommitted).
70. Webster, 492 U.S. at 490.
71. Id. at 513 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.029 (1986)).
72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.029 (1986).
73. Webster, 492 U.S. at 520. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.030(1986) ("No abortion of
a viable unborn child shall be performed unless necessary to preserve the life or health of the
woman").
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[T]he rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a
Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking
in general principles, as ours does. The key elements of the Roe
framework-trimesters and viability-are not found in the text of
the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a
constitutional principle.74
According to the Court, "we do not see why the State's interest in protecting
potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability,
and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after
viability but prohibiting it before viability. '75 Therefore, although Webster
chipped away at Roe's foundation, it did not overturn the decision.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey the Court considered the constitutionality
of five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as
amended in 1988 and 1989.76 The Court upheld as constitutional four of the
five provisions, rejecting the third one (which required spousal notification for
an abortion) based on what it called the undue burden standard, which the
Court defined as "shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 77 The undue burden standard is,
according to most observers, a departure from Roe and its progeny, which
require that any state restrictions on abortion be subject to strict scrutiny. 78 The
Casey Court, nevertheless, claimed to be more consistent with the spirit and
letter of Roe than the interpretations and applications of Roe's principles in
subsequent Court opinions. 79 By subscribing to the undue burden standard, the
74. Id. at 519.
75. Id.
76. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
77. Id. at 877.
78. That is, in order to be valid, any restrictions on access to abortion must be essential to
meeting a compelling state interest. For example, laws that forbid yelling "fire" in a crowded
theater pass strict scrutiny and thus do not violate the First Amendment right to freedom of
expression.
79. As the Court stated:
Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not
only the woman's liberty but also the States "important and legitimate interest in
potential life." That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little
acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases. Those
cases decided that any regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive
strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling
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Casey Court held that a state may restrict abortion by passing laws which may
not withstand strict scrutiny, but which nevertheless do not result in an undue
burden for the pregnant woman. For example, the Court upheld as
constitutional two provisions in the Pennsylvania statute, a 24-hour waiting-
period requirement and an informed-consent requirement (i.e., the abortion-
provider must present the woman with facts of fetal development, risks of
abortion and childbirth, and information about abortion alternatives), that
would have most likely not survived constitutional muster with the Court's pre-
Webster composition. 0
Although the Casey Court upheld Roe as a precedent, the plurality opinion,
joined by three Reagan-Bush appointees, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
rejected both Roe's requirement that restrictions be subject to strict scrutiny and
its trimester framework (which Webster had already discarded).8' According to
the Court, the trimester framework was too rigid and was unnecessary to protect
a woman's right to abortion.8 2 Although the Court reaffirmed viability as the
time at which the state has a compelling interest in protecting prenatal life, it
seems to provide a more objective definition than it did in Roe (which, as we
saw above, included the nebulous notion of "meaningful life"), despite the fact
that it claimed to derive its definition from Roe: "[V]iability, as we noted in
Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb .... ,, 3
state interest. Not all of the cases decided under that formulation can be reconciled
with the holding in Roe itself that the State has legitimate interests in the health of
the woman and in protecting the potential life within her. In resolving this tension,
we choose to rely upon Roe, as against the later cases.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (citations omitted).
80. In fact, the Court explicitly overrules Akron and Thornburgh:
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the
government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those
of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus, those cases go too far,
are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an important interest in potential
life, and are overruled.
Id. at 882.
81. Id. at 872.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 870. Despite the fact that the Court claims to derive its definition from Roe,
Roe 's nebulous notion of "meaningful life" seems inconsistent with the Court's rationale in
Casey. Id.
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One must look critically at the Court's viability criterion and the arguments it
has presented for it in both Roe and Casey. In Roe, Justice Blackmun wrote:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so
because the fetus presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life
after viability thus has both logical and biological justification.8 4
Assuming that Justice Blackmun is using "meaningful life" to mean
"independent life," he commits either one of two fallacies, depending on how
he defines independent life.85 If by "independent life" he means a being that
does not require the physical resources of another being in order for it to
survive, e.g., a viable fetus, then Blackmun's argument is circular. He would
be arguing that viability is justified as the time at which the state's interest in
prenatal life becomes compelling because at that time the fetus is an
independent life, i.e., viable.
Stuart Rosenbaum responds to the charge that Blackmun's argument is
circular by denying that Blackmun is presenting an argument at all. He claims
that "[s]ince Blackmun does not present an argument, he quite obviously does
not present a circular argument. Blackmun observes that the state has an
interest in protecting fetal life. Period., 86 It is not clear how Blackmun's
opinion could become better because he offers no argument, rather than a
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
85. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Webster seems to bear this out:
For my part, I remain convinced, as six other Members of this court 16 years
ago were convinced, that the Roe framework, and the viability standard in
particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to safeguard the constitutional
liberties of pregnant women while recognizing and accommodating the State's
interest in potential human life. The viability line reflects the biological facts and
truths of fetal development; it marks the threshold moment prior to which a fetus
cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be
regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of
the pregnant woman. At the same time, the viability standard takes account of the
undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its
dependence on the uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential
human life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes
compelling.
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989).
86. Stuart Rosenbaum, Abortion, the Constitution, and Metaphysics, 43 J. CHURCH &
STATE 715 (2001).
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fallacious one, for his viability standard. Ironically, Mr. Rosenbaum attacks
such an assessment of Blackmun as a "strawman" argument.17 I suppose I
could respond to this charge by claiming that I was not actually offering an
argument, but, like Rosenbaum's Justice Blackmun, I was merely stipulating
the correctness of my point of view without offering any reasons, good or bad,
whatsoever. But that type of response would lack intellectual integrity. A
better response would be to show that Rosenbaum is simply mistaken, that he
has not read Blackmun carefully. Let me again quote Justice Blackmun's
argument, putting in italics the words logicians call inference indicators, words
that show that the author is offering a reason or reasons for a conclusion and/or
a conclusion inferred from a reason or reasons:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so
because the fetus presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life
after viability thus has both logical and biological justification. 8
In the second sentence, "this" is shorthand for the first sentence. Therefore,
Blackmun is saying that the first sentence is a conclusion for what follows
"because," just as one would say: "Fred is guilty. This is so because the police
found the murder weapon in his apartment." In the third and last sentence
Blackmun summarizes his argument by concluding that "state regulation
protective of fetal life after viability . . . has both logical and biological
justification," that is, the Court is justified in its holding because there is logical
and biological support for it. Although a fallacious argument, it is an argument:
it offers a conclusion and appeals to reason.
However, what if by "independent life" Blackmun meant a being that is a
separate and distinct being even if it is does require the physical resources of
another particular being in order for it to survive, e.g., one of two conjoined
twins who share vital organs. In that case, the unborn has independent life
from the moment of conception and viability is merely the time at which it need
not physically depend on its mother in order for it to survive. That is,
undergoing an accidental change from dependent to independent does not
change the identity of the being undergoing the change. Christopher Reeve did
not cease to be Christopher Reeve, nor did he become less of a being, merely
because a tragic accident left him dependent on others for his very survival.8 9
87. "Beckwith's charge of circularity is a 'strawman' reading of Blackmun .. " Id. at
716.
88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
89. In response to this sort of analogy, David Boonin writes:
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The "he" that underwent that change remained the same "he." Consequently,
changing from non-viable to viable or vice versa does not impart to, or remove
from a being any property or properties that would change that being's
identity. In fact, when Blackmun claimed that the unborn undergoes change, or
goes from non-viable to viable, he was implying that the unborn is in fact a
being distinct from, though changing its dependence in relation to, its mother.
Because viability is a measure of the sophistication and/or accessibility of our
neonatal life-support systems (including both technological and human, e.g.,
parents, caregivers), the fetus remains the same while viability changes. For
One common objection to the viability criterion is that it excludes from the class of
individuals with a right to life people who clearly have such a right, such as,
according to one such critic people with pacemakers or on heart-lung machines
.... But this is a puzzling objection. A fetus that could survive on a heart-lung
machine is a paradigmatic example of a fetus that is viable, not one that is unviable.
DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 130 (2003), citing Richard Werner, Hare on Abortion,
36.4 Analysis 204 (June 1976).
This is a puzzling response, for it seems to make the very point the objection is making: if
physical dependence is morally relevant in determining the ontological status of any being, then
why should it matter if the being is dependent on another being (e.g., its mother or its conjoined
twin) or a machine (e.g., an incubator or a heart-lung machine)? But, as the objection points out,
if it is morally irrelevant in the latter case, then it is morally irrelevant in the former as well.
Consequently, physical dependence on another (whether a person or a machine) is not a morally
relevant property in assessing one's ontological status. Boonin, nevertheless, replies that
because "viability means merely the ability to survive outside the womb of the woman in whom
the fetus is conceived," and because "we can distinguish between being dependent on a
particular person and being dependent on some person or other," and because "the viability
criterion maintains that the former property is morally relevant, while the purported
counterexamples [e.g., heart-lung machine] establish only that the latter is morally irrelevant,"
and because "the moral relevance of the former is not entailed by the latter," these
counterexamples "are ultimately ineffective." Id.. at 130. This reply begs the question, for all
that Boonin is doing is restating the viability criterion and that its proponents maintain that an
unborn human being's unique physical dependence on its mother is morally relevant while a
postnatal human being's dependence on some person or other is not. But that is precisely the
distinction the proponent of the viability criterion has to demonstrate, and Boonin fails to do so.
The power of the counterexamples is that they extract from the viability criterion the property
that is doing all the moral work--dependence. The key for Boonin is to show that the inability
to survive outside the womb in which one was conceived is a type of dependence that when
ended results in one's ontological status changing from a being that does not have a right to life
to one that does.
Although Boonin evaluates the viability criterion as a criterion ofpersonhood rather than the
point at which the state has a compelling interest in the unborn (as the Court does), his
assessment of the viability criterion is applicable to the latter as well.
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this reason, the viability standard seems to be arbitrary and inapplicable to the
philosophical question of whether the unborn is a full-fledged member of the
human community. Thus, according to the Court, a viable child born at twenty-
two-weeks gestation in 2003 is fully human while a non-viable prenatal child at
thirty-weeks gestation in 1900 is not fully human. This is absurd, because our
technological advances do not change the nature of the dependent being.
90
Blackmun, therefore, seems to be confusing physical independence with
ontological independence; he mistakenly argues from the fact of the pre-viable
unborn's lack of independence from its mother that it is not an independent
being, a "meaningful life." 9' According to noted prolife advocate and professor
of political science Hadley Arkes:
Once again, the Court fell into the fallacy of drawing a moral
conclusion (the right to take a life) from a fact utterly without moral
significance (the weakness or dependence of the child). The Court
90. Boonin replies to this type of argument by offering a counterexample:
Consider.. .an adult human being with a particular form of brain injury that has
caused him to lapse into an irreversible coma. Most people would agree that he
does not have the same right to life as you and I. But it is of course possible that
technological advances might some day make it possible to bring people with
precisely the same form of brain injury out of their comas. Were that to happen, we
would surely say that the individual did have the same right to life as you or I, since
this is what we say of people who are only temporarily unconscious. This would
be to make his moral standing relative to the existing state of technology, and in a
way that seems perfectly appropriate.
BooNiN, supra note 89, at 131.
Setting aside the question of whether the irreversibly comatose have the same right to life as
you or I, Boonin misses the point of this objection by finding in it a principle its more
sophisticated advocates are not employing: moral standing is never relative to technological
advances. After all, a prolifer would argue that an abortion morally permissible in times past to
save the life of the mother may not be permissible today due to advances in medical technology.
Rather, the objection is making the point that there is no moral difference between two human
beings that are identical in every way except that one is dependent on technology and the other
on its mother. So, to conscript Boonin's counterexample: if the comatose person could be
brought back by either new technology or a newly discovered herb, his moral standing would
not hinge on whether his recovery depended on artificial or natural means.
91. Blackmun reveals this confusion in his dissent in Webster: "IT]he viability standard
takes account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it
loses its dependence on the uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential
human life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes compelling." Webster
v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989).
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discovered, in other words, that novel doctrines could be wrought by
reinventing old fallacies. 92
One may make two other observations about the viability criterion. First,
one could argue that the non-viability of the unborn, and the dependence and
vulnerability that goes with that status, should lead one to have more rather than
less concern for the unborn. That is, a human being's dependence and
vulnerability is a call for her parents, family, and the wider human community
to care and nurture her, rather than a justification to kill her. Second, each of
us, including the unborn, is non-viable in relation to his environment. If any
one of us were to be placed naked on the moon or the earth's North Pole, one
would quickly become aware of one's non-viability. Therefore, the unborn
prior to the time she can live outside her mother's womb is as non-viable in
relation to her environment as we are non-viable in relation to ours.93
92. HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
JUSTICE 378-79 (1986).
93. For a revealing response to my arguments against Blackmun's use of the viability
criterion, see Rosenbaum, supra note 86, 716-19 (responding to arguments that appeared in
Francis J. Beckwith, Law, Religion, and Metaphysics: A Reply to Simmons, 43 J. CHURCH &
STATE 715 (Winter, 2001)). His response, however, is disappointing, for Rosenbaum does not
actually engage my arguments, but rather, dismisses them as not relevant because, according to
Rosenbaum, Blackmun was discussing the Constitutional permissibility of abortion and did not
intend for the viability criteron to be an answer to any philosophical question on the nature of
human beings and/or persons. Id. at 716. But this response is a red herring-for, as we have
seen, the viability criterion was advanced by Blackmun as a standard by which the law marks off
one set of human beings (prenatal ones) as objects that may be killed without justification and
marks off another set of human beings as subjects that may do the killing with the law's
permission. To employ an illustration: Imagine that the law were to allow whites to own blacks,
as it did prior to President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. Suppose that the Supreme
Court upheld this law and based its opinion on the "pigment standard," a criterion that asserts
that when one's flesh reaches a certain dark hue then one could be a slave to the first white man
to come along. It would seem perfectly sensible, and entirely legitimate, on the part of the
Court's critics to say that this criterion is arbitrary, flimsy, and without warrant because skin
color carries no moral weight to justify such a judicial opinion. And the critics could offer
arguments to support the conclusion on which this criticism is based: there is no ontological
difference between whites and blacks that warrants treating blacks as property. A Rosenbaum-
like comeback to such arguments--"issues of ontology are issues for metaphysicians,
philosphers, and theologians" or "Supreme Court justices, and ontologically modest others,
pursue issues in the historical world of human society and human practice," id. at 717,-is no
response to these arguments. It is a red herring, a rhetorical distraction, that does not engage the
arguments for the case for which they have been offered.
However, what is more troubling is that Rosenbaum labels me as exhibiting a lack of
wisdom, "metaphysical imperialism" and "paternalism," as well as claiming that I lack modesty,
do not live "in the real world" and that I raise "arcane issues." Id. at 717 (He also calls me a
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The Casey Court's defense of the viability criterion offers two reasons. First,
the Court appeals to stare decisis, the judicial practice of giving great deference
to precedents. But because the precedent to which the Court appealed, Roe,
relies on fallacious reasoning to ground the viability criterion and is thus a
precedent that is not justified, this first reason has no merit. But that does not
stop the Court from offering as a second reason the reasoning employed by
Justice Blackmun in Roe to defend the viability criterion. This is a peculiar
strategy of argument, for if precedent is sufficient, why also appeal to the
reasoning for that precedent? Could the reasoning for the precedent be flawed
and the precedent itself still be employed to "justify" a subsequent legal
opinion? Or could a precedent be justifiably rejected in an applicable case even
though the precedent is grounded in impeccable reasoning? In any event, the
Court's second reason is an argument that contains, along with a conclusion, its
definition of viability as the argument's premise. In its Casey opinion, the
Court stated:
[V]iability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic
possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so
that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and
fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights
of the woman.94
This argument is as fallacious in Casey as it was in Roe. The Court first
defines viability and then from that premise of biological fact draws the
normative conclusion that it is only fair and reasonable that after viability the
State has a right to protect the unborn. If you did not know that this was from a
Supreme Court opinion, you might have attributed it to a Monty Python skit or
a bad freshman paper in Critical Thinking, or even Susan Sarandon. Instead,
the statement is a product of judicial "reasoning," though sadly, it is neither
"philosophical fundamentalist." Id. at 723.). Although Rosenbaum claims that "genuinely
reasonable people will surely detect the inadequacy of the alleged reasons Beckwith suggests
might deter them from accepting the viability standard of Blackmun and Simmons," id. at 718,
he does not present the actual grounds by which these reasonable people would reject my
reasons qua reasons. He merely points out that they are irrelevant to an opinion of the Supreme
Court on a question of Constitutional law. At some point Rosenbaum has to actually get his
hands dirty and engage the arguments rather than resort to name-calling. As I tell my students,
when your opponent tries to exclude your view by some technicality and/or some pejorative
assessment of your character or belief that have nothing to do with the quality of the arguments
you offer, consider it a victory, for if your opponent actually had a response, he or she would
have used it.
94. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
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judicious nor reasoned. The Court's premise, the biological fact of fetal
nonviability through roughly the first six months of pregnancy, cannot possibly
provide sufficient warrant for the conclusion that it is fair and just, and required
by our Constitution, for the government to permit, with virtually no restrictions,
the unborn's mother to kill it before it is viable. In order for the Court to make
its argument valid, it would have to add to its factual premise a normative
premise stating that whenever a human being cannot live on its own because it
uniquely depends on another human being for its physical existence, it is
permissible for the second human being to kill the first in order to rid the
second of this burden. If the Court were to add this second premise, its
argument, though now valid, would contain a premise even more controversial
than the abortion right it is attempting to justify, and for that reason would
require a premise or premises to justify it.
The Casey Court also ignored the scholarly criticisms of Roe's justification
of the abortion right. First, the key premises of Justice Blackmun's case, e.g.,
that abortion was a common law liberty and that the primary purpose of
nineteenth century abortion law was to protect women from dangerous
operations, have been soundly refuted in the scholarly literature. Second,
Justice Blackmun's case against the unborn's status as a Fourteenth
Amendment person is questionable. Third, his argument that the unborn is not
a Fourteenth Amendment person because experts disagree on this point,
undermines the right to abortion as well as providing a reason to prohibit
abortion.
Instead of restating these bad arguments, the Casey Court invented new
ones. It upheld Roe on the basis of stare decisis based on two justifications.
First, the Court claimed that the public had a reliance interest in Roe's
permission of abortion. 95 Second, the Court stated that its own legitimacy and
the public's respect for the rule of law depended on judicial consistency.96
Concerning the first, the Court argued that it would be unjust to overturn the
right to abortion because women and men have relied on the ability to abort by
planning and arranging their lives with the abortion right in mind.97 And
secondly, if the Court were to overturn Roe, it would suffer a loss of respect in
the public's eye and perhaps chip away at its own legitimacy, even if rejecting
95. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
96. Id. at 854.
97. "[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail." Id.
at 869.
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Roe would in fact correct an error in constitutional jurisprudence.98
Nevertheless, in the opening comments of Casey, the Court speaks of abortion
as a liberty interest grounded in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.99 Yet, even the Roe Court understood that abortion had been
banned nearly everywhere in the U.S. for quite some time. Thus abortion could
not easily be construed as a fundamental liberty found in our Nation's traditions
and history unless the reason for banning abortion was rendered obsolete and
unless the fetus was not protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Roe
Court made this argument, one that we now know was largely based on a
distortion of history that virtually all scholars concede was false and
misleading.l°° Therefore, nothing of any substance was left for the Casey Court
to support its rationale except an appeal to stare decisis based on the reliance
interest and the public's perception of the Court's legitimacy.'01 After all, if the
Casey Court really believed that Roe's reasoning was sound, that abortion was
really a fundamental liberty found in our Nation's traditions and history, it
would have made that argument rather than relying on stare decisis. But the
implications of this rationale are daunting. By putting in place the premises of
jurisprudence that it did, the Court gave cover to future courts to "justify" about
any perversity it wants to uphold or "discover." For example, given the
premises of Casey, the Court could knowingly, and "justifiably," deprive a
citizen of his or her fundamental rights if the Court believes that a vast majority
of other citizens have relied on that deprivation, and to declare it unjust would
make the Court look bad in the eyes of the beneficiaries of this injustice.
Here's the lesson: if a bad decision cannot be overturned because it is bad, then
we cannot rely on the Court to protect a good opinion when it is good, if what is
doing all the work is narcissus stare decisis-upholding precedent if it helps
your image.
98. "A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would
address error, if there was error, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the
Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law." Id.
99. Id. at 844-53.
100. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
101. Oddly enough, the Court does claim it will not reexamine Roe "because neither the
factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our understanding of it has changed (and
because no other indication of weakened precedent has been shown)." Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
This is a curious argument, for it is unlikely that Court and its clerks did not know that there
exists a massive volume of scholarly literature that shows that the Roe opinion is significantly
flawed in its history and its logic. Unless the Court means something else by the term "factual
underpinnings," nothing but willful ignorance can account for the Court not taking this
scholarship into serious consideration when assessing the merits of this case and crafting an
opinion for it.
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Apparently Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Court's Webster
opinion, got it right when he made the comment in his dissenting opinion in
Casey:
Roe v. Wade stands as a sort ofjudicial Potemkin Village, which may
be pointed to passers-by as a monument to the importance of adhering
to precedent. But behind the facade, an entirely new method of
analysis, without any roots in constitutional law, is imported to decide
the constitutionality of state laws regulating abortion. Neither stare
decisis nor 'legitimacy' are truly served by such an effort. 0 2
Beginning in 1996, then-President Bill Clinton vetoed several bills passed by
the U.S. Congress to prohibit what pro-life activists call "partial-birth
abortion."' 1 3 Also known as D & X (for dilation and extraction) abortion, this
procedure is performed in some late-term abortions. Using ultrasound, the
doctor grips the fetus's legs with forceps. The fetus is then pulled out through
the birth canal and delivered with the exception of its head. While the head is
in the womb the doctor penetrates the live fetus's skull with scissors, opens the
scissors to enlarge the hole, and then inserts a catheter. The fetus's brain is
vacuumed out, resulting in the skull's collapse. The doctor then completes the
womb's evacuation by removing the dead fetus.
Although none of the congressional bills became law, thirty states, including
Nebraska, passed similar laws that prohibited D & X abortions. However, in
Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down
Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions. The Court cited two grounds for its
decision. First, the Court stated the law lacked an exception for the
preservation of the mother's health, which Casey required of any restrictions on
abortion. Second, the Court claimed that Nebraska's ban imposed an undue
burden on a woman's fundamental right to have an abortion.'04
Although Nebraska's statute had an exception for situations where the
mother's life is in danger, the Court pointed out that Casey requires an
exception for both the life and health of the mother if a state wants to prohibit
post-viability abortions. 05 But Nebraska did not limit its ban to D & X
abortions performed only after viability. Its ban applied throughout pregnancy.
102. Id. at 966 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
103. See Center for Reproductive Rights, http://www.crlp.org/hill_pripba.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2006).
104. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
105. Id. at 930 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
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Therefore, according to the Court, unless Nebraska can show that its ban does
not increase a woman's health risk, it is unconstitutional. The Court stated:
The State fails to demonstrate that banning D & X without a health
exception may not create significant health risks for women, because
the record shows that significant medical authority supports the
proposition that in some circumstances, D & X, would be, the safest
procedure. 106
As Justice Kennedy points out in his dissent, "[t]he most to be said for the D &
X is it may present an unquantified lower risk of complication for a particular
patient but that other proven safe procedures remain available even for this
patient., 10 7 However, even if in some cases D & X is in fact safer than other
types of abortion, the relative risk between procedures108 cannot justify
overturning the law if the increased risk is statistically negligible and if the
State has an interest in prenatal life throughout pregnancy which becomes
compelling enough after viability to prohibit abortion. 10 9 After all, if "the
relative physical safety of these procedures, with the slight possible difference"
requires that the Court to invalidate Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortion,
then the Court proves too much." 0 For with such premises in hand one may
conclude that a ban on infanticide is unconstitutional as well, for a parent who
kills her handicapped newborn eliminates the possibility that this child from
infancy to adulthood will drain her resources, tax her emotions, and require
physical activity not demanded by non-handicapped children. Consequently, to
conscript Justice Stephen Breyer's language, the State that bans infanticide fails
to demonstrate that this prohibition without a health exception may not create
significant health risks for women, because the record shows that significant
medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances,
infanticide, would best advance the mother's health.
106. Id. at 932.
107. Id. at 967 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108. As Justice Kennedy points out in his dissent, there is impressive medical opinion that D
& X abortion is not any less risky and may in some cases increase the risk to a woman's health.
See id. at 966 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,519 (1989);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 ("Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and
regulations designed to encourage [a woman] to know that there are philosophic and social
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to
full term and there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as
well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.").
110. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 967 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The Court's second reason for rejecting Nebraska's law is that the ban on D
& X imposed an undue burden on a woman's fundamental right to have an
abortion. For the type of abortion performed in 95 percent of the cases between
the twelfth and twentieth weeks of pregnancy, D & E abortion (dilation and
evacuation), is similar to D & X abortion."' Therefore, the Court reasoned that
if a ban on D & X abortions is legally permissible, then so is a ban on D & E
abortions. However, that would imperil the right to abortion. Hence
Nebraska's ban imposes an undue burden on the pregnant woman, and thus
violates the standard laid down in Casey. As both Justice Thomas and Justice
Kennedy point out in their separate dissents, by reading Nebraska's law in this
way, the Court abandoned its long-standing doctrine of statutory construction,
that statutes should be read in a way that is consistent with the Constitution if
such a reading is plausible." 2  Therefore, in Stenberg the Court read
Nebraska's statute in the least charitable way one could read it. Moreover,
Justice Thomas, in a blistering dissent, shows, in meticulous and graphic detail,
that D & X and D & E procedures are dissimilar enough that it is "highly
doubtful that" Nebraska's D & X ban "could be applied to ordinary D & E."11
3
In 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law a federal partial-birth
abortion ban, which contains both a life of the mother exception as well as a
more circumspect definition of D & X abortion. 14  It was immediately
challenged in federal court by abortion-choice groups.1 5 It is unclear if this
law, more carefully crafted than Nebraska's, will pass constitutional muster,
especially since the law does not include the kind of expansive maternal health
exception that the Stenberg opinion suggests such a restriction must include. 1
6
In 2002, the U.S. Congress, with the signature of President Bush, passed the
"Born-Alive Infants Protection Act," the brainchild of the inestimable Hadley
111. Id. at 924.
112. "Were there any doubt remaining the statute could apply to a D & E procedure, that
doubt is no ground for invalidating the statute. Rather, we are bound to first consider whether a
construction of that statute is fairly possible that would avoid the constitutional question." Id. at
996 (citing Erznoznick v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) and Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). See also id. at 973 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 990-92 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
115. Robert B. Bluey, Lawsuits Challenge Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, CNSNews.com, 31
Oct. 2003, available at http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/archive/200310/CUL20031031c.html
(last visited on Dec. 2, 2006).
116. This is what the 2003 federal law asserts: "This subsection does not apply to a partial-
birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical
condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself." 18 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(a) (2003).
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Arkes. 117  The Act requires that any child who survives an abortion be
immediately accorded all the protections of the law that are accorded all other
postnatal human beings. Although, in the words of Arkes, the act is a "modest
first step," it is not an insignificant step. 81 8 It affirms that an abortion entails the
termination-expulsion of a being who, if she survives, should receive all the
protections of our laws. But this, of course, raises an awkward question for
abortion-choice supporters. What is it, then, about that vaginal passageway that
changes the child's nature in such a significant fashion that it may be killed
without justification before exit but only with justification after exit? The Act
put in place a premise that elicits questions that lead one back to the most
important question in this debate: Who and what are we?
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court currently affirms a woman's right to abortion with
virtually no restrictions prior to fetal viability. After viability, it only allows
states to make restrictions prior to viability that do not entail an undue burden.
However, given the wideness of the Supreme Court's "health exception," a
state's ability to restrict post-viability abortions is questionable, especially given
the Court's Stenberg opinion and Roe's pre-Casey progeny. Thus, according to
the current legal regime in the United States, the unborn is not protected by the
U.S. Constitution from death-by-abortion at any stage in her nine-month
gestation.
117. Although published before the Act became law, one should read Arkes' elegant account
of the Act's history as well as his public encounters with certain members of Congress. HADLEY
ARKES, NATuRAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE 234-94 (2002).
118. Id.at 89.
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